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CITY COURT OF NEW YORK
CITY OF WATERTOWN
People v. Saldana'
(decided December 7, 2009)
Jason Saldana lived in the northern part of New York in a
small town called Watertown.2 Two days after a small fire broke out
at his residence, he was arrested by the Watertown Police Department
after the local fire department found evidence of a marijuana growing
operation.3 At trial, Mr. Saldana sought to suppress the marijuana
cultivation evidence on the basis that the police obtained the evidence
in violation of the necessary warrant requirements under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution' and article I, section
12 of the New York State Constitution.5 The trial court granted the
motion and dismissed the indictment because the police's warrantless
search and seizure did not satisfy any of the exclusionary rule excep-
tions to the Fourth Amendment.6
The conflagration occurred on the early evening of August 30,
2009, at Jason Saldana's residence.7 Responding to the call was both
the Watertown Fire Department and Watertown Police Department
Officer Frederick March.8 The fire department extinguished the fire
and, while performing the usual search of the residence for victims or
No. 43564, 2009 WL 4667446 (N.Y. City Ct. Dec. 7, 2009).
2 Id. at * 1.
3 Id.
4 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, house, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause...." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The New York Constitution states, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons, house, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... ".N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 12.
6 Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at *2, 4-5.
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signs of arson, came upon a marijuana cultivation operation.' The
firefighters egressed from the home and notified Officer March that
they had found something on the third floor.'o Officer March was
brought up to the location of the fire and observed a marijuana grow-
ing operation in plain view."
Officer March returned downstairs and questioned Saldana
about the contraband in the attic.12 Saldana initially claimed he was
"growing pumpkins and vegetables."' 3  However, approximately an
hour and a half after Officer March responded to the scene, Saldana
admitted to cultivating about fifteen marijuana plants for his personal
use.14 Subsequently, Saldana furnished a supporting deposition and
gave "the police permission to search [t]he house and collect the ma-
rijuana."15 After this supporting deposition was obtained, another of-
ficer arrived and collected the contraband as evidence.16 In addition
to the marijuana plants, firefighters found a badly-burned marijuana-
smoking device that Saldana admitted was used to smoke his home-
grown drugs.' 7 However, Officer March declined to seize the bong
as evidence.' 8  Consequent of his growing operation, Saldana was
charged with cannabis cultivation and issued a ticket to appear in
court.' 9
During preliminary proceedings, Saldana filed a Notice of
Motion arguing that the indictment should be dismissed.20 Saldana
argued that all evidence seized should be suppressed because the po-
lice's entry and search of his residence was illegal.2' In response, the
9 Id.
10 Id.










21 Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at * 1. Additionally, Saldana contested the constitutionali-
ty of the supporting deposition that he gave to Officer March. Id. at *1 n.2. However, the
City Court of New York decided not to consider the issue of whether the consent was valid.
Id. For a more in depth analysis of the issue of retroactive consent and how it impacts the
legality of a warrantless search, see Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Effect of Retroactive
Consent on Legality of Otherwise Unlawful Search and Seizure, 76 A.L.R.5th 563 (2004).
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People filed an affidavit stating that the entry and seizure by the po-
lice was lawful under the exclusionary exceptions to the federal and
state warrant requirements, specifically the emergency exception or
the inevitable discovery exception.22
The issue at trial was "the propriety of Officer March's war-
rantless search of Mr. Saldana's home."23 The judge analyzed the
People's second argument that "even if Officer March's search
wasn't properly sanctioned, the marijuana plants should be admitted
pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine."24 Upon reviewing the
inevitable discovery doctrine, the judge held that the People's argu-
ment did not meet the burden necessary to permit the admission of
the marijuana plants into evidence at trial.25 Furthermore, "even if
the People meet this burden, the doctrine exempts only secondary
evidence from exclusion, not that evidence won at the Constitution's
expense."26 The judge held that the marijuana seized as a result of
Officer March's search was considered "primary evidence" and
therefore may not be admissible at trial. 27 As a result of the court's
decision, Saldana's motion to dismiss was granted on the grounds
that Officer March's entry was in violation of the Fourth Amendment
and article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution.28
22 Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at * 1.
23 Id. The city court first analyzed whether the search of Saldana's home by Officer
March fell into one of the various emergency exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id at
*2. Explaining that emergency exceptions have been used "when public safety concerns ec-
lipse those of privacy," the judge concluded that the search of Saldana's residence did not
fall into the exceptions for two reasons. Id. First, no emergency situation existed at the time
the officer entered Saldana's home. Id. Second, the officer's "apparent intent was to inves-
tigate a crime, not to provide emergency services." Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at *3. For
the author's detailed exploration in regards to the emergency exceptions to the exclusionary
rule as applied to People v. Saldana, see Ara Ayvazian, City Court ofNew York, City of Wa-
tertown, People v. Saldana, 27 Touro L. Rev. 685 (2011).
24 Id. at *4.
25 Id. at *4-5 ("To prevail, the People must demonstrate to a very high degree of probabili-
ty that normal police procedures would have uncovered the challenged evidence indepen-
dently of [a] tainted source." (quoting People v. Payton, 380 N.E.2d 224, 231 (N.Y. 1978)
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
26 Id. at *4.
27 Id. at *5. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text for a discussion on the distinc-
tions between primary and secondary evidence.
28 Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at *5. Therefore, the court ruled that seizure of a marijua-
na growing operation, occurring as a result of a warrantless search, when no emergency ex-
ception continued to exist, and no facts required for the implication of the inevitable discov-
ery doctrine, infringed on a person's Fourth Amendment and New York Constitutional
rights.
3
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The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.29
With this statutory language of the Fourth Amendment comes the ju-
dicially-created exclusionary rule. 30 Under this rule, "evidence ob-
tained in violation of an individual's right to be secure against unrea-
sonable search and seizure is inadmissible in a criminal
proceeding."3  This rule, also known as the "fruit of the poisonous-
tree doctrine," has caused much confusion in the courts due to mul-
tiple exceptions created by the judiciary.32 These exceptions include
the independent source doctrine, attenuation, and the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine.33 The inevitable discovery doctrine was the most
recent doctrine to be implemented and is closely related to the older
independent source doctrine.34
The United States Supreme Court first adopted the inevitable
discovery doctrine in Nix v. Williams.35 In Nix, the Supreme Court
examined whether a murder victim's body would have inevitably
been found during an on-going search had the defendant not directed
29 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30 See Stephen E. Hessler, Comment, Establishing Inevitability without Active Pursuit:
Defining the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule,
99 MICH. L. REV. 238, 239 (2000); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)
("The [exclusionary] rule thus operates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights." (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
31 Hessler, supra note 30, at 238.
32 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.2 (4th ed. 1996) ("For well over
half a century now, the validity and efficacy of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
have been vigorously debated by legal commentators."); see generally 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURES § 11.4(a) (4th ed. 2004).
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440-41 (1984) (inevitable discovery doctrine); Nardone,
308 U.S. at 341 (attenuation doctrine); Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 392 (1920) (independent source doctrine).
34 See supra note 33; Nix, 467 U.S. at 443-44.
3 467 U.S. 431.
634 [Vol. 27
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officials to the body.36 Examining the exceptions to the exclusionary
rule of the Fourth Amendment, the Court made clear that evidence
that has been illegally obtained is not always inadmissible in court.37
The Court first examined the independent source doctrine,
which "allows admission of evidence that has been discovered by
means wholly independent of any constitutional violation."3 ' The
Court stated that the prime purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
police misconduct. 39 "If the prosecution can establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably
would have been discovered by lawful means-here the volunteers'
search-then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evi-
dence should be received." 40  The Court strongly stated the
"[e]xclusion of physical evidence that would inevitably have been
discovered adds nothing to either the integrity or fairness of a crimi-
nal trial." 4' To support its notion that the inevitable discovery doc-
trine would not extinguish the deterrence of unlawful police behavior,
the Court stated:
[W]hen an officer is aware that the evidence will in-
evitably be discovered, he will try to avoid engaging
in any questionable practice. In that situation, there
will be little to gain from taking any dubious "short-
cuts" to obtain the evidence. Significant disincentives
to obtaining evidence illegally-including the possibili-
ty of departmental discipline and civil liability-also
lessen the likelihood that the ultimate or inevitable
discovery exception will promote police misconduct.42
The paramount point derived from Nix is the Court's adoption of the
inevitable discovery doctrine, that is: if the evidence that is being
challenged would have been discovered absent any constitutional vi-
36 Id. at 434.
" Id. at 441.
3 Id. at 443.
3 Id. at 442-43 ("The core rationale consistently advanced by this Court for extending the
exclusionary rule to evidence that is the fruit of unlawful police conduct has been that this
admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations of con-
stitutional and statutory protections.").
40 Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
41 Id. at 446.
42 Id. at 445-46.
2011] 635
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olation, it will be admissible at trial.43
However, one vital point concerning Nix is that the Court
made no attempt "to define the contours" of the inevitable discovery
exception.4 In trying to answer what "inevitable" means, the Court
stated that "inevitable discovery involves no speculative elements but
focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification
or impeachment." 45 Nevertheless, for one to say that evidence would
have inevitably been discovered "involves some degree of specula-
tion. The exception requires the district court to determine, viewing
affairs as they existed at the instant before the unlawful search, what
would have happened had the unlawful search never occurred." 46
More recently, the Supreme Court in Hudson v. Michigan,47
discussed in dictum the inevitable discovery doctrine in relation to
the ensuing procurement of a search warrant.48 The Court stated the
inevitable discovery doctrine:
[R]efers to discovery that did occur or that would have
occurred (1) despite (not simply in the absence oj) the
unlawful behavior and (2) independently of that un-
lawful behavior. The government cannot, for exam-
ple, avoid suppression of evidence seized without a
warrant (or pursuant to a defective warrant) simply by
showing that it could have obtained a valid warrant
had it sought one.49
Instead, the government "must show that the same evidence
'inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.' "'o Addi-
tionally, the Court stated that "[t]he inevitable discovery exception
rests upon the principle that the remedial purposes of the exclusio-
nary rule are not served by suppressing evidence discovered through
a 'later, lawful seizure' that is 'genuinely independent of an earlier,
tainted one.' "
4 Id at 444.
4 United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1204 (5th Cir. 1985).
45 Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5.
46 United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original).
47 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
48 Id. at 616.
49 Id. (emphasis in original)
so Id. (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 444).
51 Id. (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988)).
[Vol. 27636
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It has been almost twenty-seven years since the Supreme
Court has discussed the inevitable discovery doctrine in great detail.52
Nix v. Williams was the Court's first and last case having to do with
this exception to the exclusionary rule. Furthermore, the question of
what makes a discovery "truly" inevitable has yet to be definitively
answered by the Court.53 However, before and after the Nix decision
lower courts have dealt with the inevitable discovery doctrine in a va-
riety of ways. One method in which courts analyze whether the doc-
trine should be used is by determining if the evidence that is chal-
lenged is direct (also known as primary) evidence, or indirect (also
known as secondary or derivative) evidence.54 Primary evidence is
the evidence that is directly seized during or as a result of a Fourth
Amendment violation. 5 Indirect evidence is evidence that is seized
after the primary illegal search.5 6  Many jurisdictions differ on
whether the inevitable discovery doctrine should apply regardless of
the evidential category or only to secondary/indirect evidence."
Shortly after Nix, the Second Circuit faced this question.
The Second Circuit applied the inevitable discovery doctrine
in United States v. Pimentel.58 In Pimentel, the court was faced with
the issue of "whether . . . the inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule applies to the direct as well as the indirect products
of the government's unlawful search."59  The Second Circuit held
that nothing in Nix stated that only the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
52 See Nix, 467 U.S. 431.
5 United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Except for the appli-
cation of its rule to the specific facts before the Court and its holding that the Government
must establish the inevitability of discovery by a preponderance of the evidence, the Su-
preme Court was silent as to what constitutes an 'inevitable' discovery under the doctrine.").
See Hessler, supra note 30, at 242.
5 See cases cited infra note 57 and accompanying text.
" Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at *4-5; 3 WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,
ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 3:3 (2010).
56 Jessica Forbes, Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception, Primary Evidence, and the
Emasculation of the Fourth Amendment, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1221, 1228 (1987).
s7 See United States v. Whitehorn, 813 F.2d 646, 650 (4th Cir. 1987) (primary evidence);
United States v. Pimentel, 810 F.2d 366, 368 (2d Cir. 1987) (both primary and secondary
evidence); United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (1st Cir. 1986) (primary evidence);
Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 846-47 (Eleventh Circuit refused to apply the doctrine to primary
evidence); United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293, 307 (8th Cir. 1983) (inevitable discovery
doctrine usually applies to secondary evidence only, but here it applied to primary).
5 810F.2d366.
5 Id. at 368.
2011] 637
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could be admissible as opposed to the "poisonous tree" itself.60 Dis-
tinguishing federal law from New York State law, the Second Cir-
cuit's holding in Pimentel evidences the application of the inevitable
discovery doctrine to both primary and secondary evidence.6 ' Al-
though some lower Second Circuit district courts do not agree with
this rationale, Pimentel is still valid law.62
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Haddix,63 was faced
with an inevitable discovery case that should be noted for its focus on
the importance of the Fourth Amendment. 4 In Haddix, police and
United States Forest Service Officers conducted an aerial search of
marijuana-growing locations.65 During the aerial search, they pin-
pointed the defendant's backyard as a possible growing zone.66
Without obtaining a warrant, ground officers entered the defendant's
backyard and noticed over sixty marijuana plants cultivating. 67 Of-
ficers knocked on the door, and with no answer, pursued inside to ar-
rest the defendant, who had asleep.68 After the arrest, police obtained
a warrant to search the rest of the home and seize the drugs.69
The court in Haddix repeated the language of the Fourth
amendment and stated:
As a practical matter, this provision normally requires
the police to have a warrant whenever their conduct
compromises an individual's privacy in his or her per-
6 Id. at 368-69.
61 Id. at 368 ("[Wjhether, under the facts of this case, the inevitable discovery exception to
the exclusionary rule applies to the direct as well as the indirect products of the govern-
ment's unlawful search. We hold that it does.").
62 See United States v. Snaith, 666 F. Supp. 645 (D. Vt. 1987).
If the police can violate an individual's constitutional rights just because
they have independent information of its existence or because they
would inevitably have found the evidence anyway, they have no motiva-
tion to honor the constitutional rights of citizens. . . . This rule, we be-
lieve, clearly violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the Fourth Amend-
ment warrant provision. However, we are constrained to follow the
rulings of the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court.
Id. at 648 n.3.
63 239 F.3d 766 (6th Cir. 2001).
6 Id. at 767.
6s Id. at 766.
6 Id.
67 id
6 Haddix, 239 F.3d at 766-67.
69 Id. at 767.
638 [Vol. 27
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sonal affairs. When the police do so without a war-
rant, however, a given search or seizure might still be
"reasonable" under a recognized exception to the war-
rant requirement. o
The court continued to explain that in this situation there were no ex-
igent circumstances for the police to proceed without a warrant.
Furthermore, the court held that "[p]olice officers may not, in their
zeal to arrest an individual, ignore the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement merely because it is inconvenient." 72  However, the
court recognized: "This Circuit acknowledges that the exclusionary
rule does not apply when the Government can demonstrate that evi-
dence found because of a Fourth Amendment violation would inevit-
ably have been discovered lawfully." 73 In light of this acknowledg-
ment the court outright rejected the prosecution's argument that
"evidence that would constitute probable cause for a warrant, even
when that evidence's existence is unknown to the police, is inherently
destined to be 'inevitably discovered.' "74 In reiterating the impor-
tance of constitutional rights, the court stated: "Today, we . . . hold
that the warrant requirement is at the very heart of the Fourth
Amendment, and that judicial exceptions to it are only exceptions."
Prior to Nix and Pimentel, the New York Court of Appeals re-
70 id.
n1 Id at 768.
72 Id. (quoting United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1164 (6th Cir. 1984)).
71 Haddix, 239 F.3d at 768 (quoting 6 LAFAVE, supra note 32, at § 11.4(a) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
74 Id. See also Hessler, supra note 30, at 275 n.185 (citing to United States v. Chantha-
vong, No. 98-4244, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21554, at *25 (4th Cir. 1999) ("The inevitable
discovery doctrine does not apply where the police officers had probable cause to conduct a
search but simply failed to obtain a warrant."); United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 320 (9th
Cir. 1995) ("This court has never applied the inevitable discovery exception so as to excuse
the failure to obtain a search warrant where the police had probable cause but simply did not
attempt to obtain a warrant."); United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674, 683 (6th Cir. 1994)
("[T]o hold that simply because the police could have obtained a warrant, it was therefore
inevitable that they would have done so would mean that there is inevitable discovery and no
warrant requirement whenever there is probable cause.")).
" Haddix, 239 F.3d at 768. See also United States v. Quinney, 583 F.3d 891, 893-95 (6th
Cir. 2009). The police moved forward with a warrantless search and unlike the police in
Haddix, never obtained a warrant. Id. at 893. The prosecutor relied on the fact that the po-
lice could have obtained a warrant. Id at 894. Needless to say, the court rejected the prose-
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viewed the inevitable discovery doctrine in People v. Fitzpatrick.6
In Fitzpatrick, the defendant had committed numerous crimes includ-
ing the murder of two police officers." As a manhunt was underway,
police entered the defendant's residence without a warrant and found
the defendant hiding in the closet.7 8 Police officers read the defen-
dant his rights and asked him where the gun used to shoot the officers
was located. 79 After revealing its location, the police seized the wea-
pon.so
At trial, the defendant argued that the evidence of the gun it-
self should be suppressed because of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree
doctrine." The court recognized that there are exceptions to the
premise that all evidence is inadmissible if obtained from unlawful
police activity. 82 The court referred to a previous United States Su-
preme Court decision and stated that not all evidence seized illegally
by the police falls under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.83
Rather, under these circumstances, the more appropriate question
would be "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality,
the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distin-
guishable to be purged of the primary taint." 84
Following this quote, the court synthesized its own under-
standing of the inevitable discovery doctrine, stating:
[E]vidence obtained as a result of information derived
from an unlawful search or other illegal police conduct
is not inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine where the normal course of police inves-
tigation would, in any case, even absent the illicit con-
duct, have inevitably led to such evidence.
Therefore, the court required that in order for the evidence illegally
76 300 N.E.2d 139 (N.Y. 1973).




at Fitzpatrick, 300 N.E.2d at 140.
82 Id. at 141.
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seized by the police to be allowed, the prosecution has to prove that
the police, by using an alternative yet legal means of search and sei-
zure, would have obtained such evidence. The court then stated
that the gun used during the crimes is the "prime object of ... inves-
tigation" and it would reasonably have expected the police to search
for it near where the defendant was found. 87 "[A] search of the closet
was inevitable regardless of the defendant's answers to questions put
to him beyond its confines, it may not fairly be said that the police
'exploited' the 'illegality' involved in their interrogation."88 More
importantly, the court, whether consciously or not, distinguished the
vital difference between primary and secondary evidence, stating: "In
the present case, it was entirely fortuitous that the police delayed the
search of the immediate area where the defendant was discovered un-
til they had begun questioning him and, as a result, very quickly
learned where the gun was located." 89 Had the police done other-
wise, the gun itself would be primary evidence and possibly excluded
under New York's application of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doc-
trine. However, the court held that the prosecution met their burden
and therefore refused to suppress the evidence.90
In a cautious concurrence, Judge Wachtler opposed the
court's adoption of the inevitable discovery doctrine.91  Worried
about how the doctrine would be used, he stated: by "allowing 'poi-
soned' evidence in on the ground that some hypothetical police
search would have uncovered the evidence anyway results in a spe-
culative theory with no discernable limits." 92 Furthermore, "[t]he
'inevitable discovery' doctrine is speculative at best, and there is ab-
solutely nothing to prevent the expansion of the doctrine far beyond
'the closet.' "9 Judge Wachtler continued to show his reluctance to
the doctrine by stating that the doctrine should be defined more clear-
ly due to the varying degrees of what the majority mentioned consti-
tutes "normal police conduct." 94 "The normal course of police inves-





9' Fitzpatrick, 300 N.E.2d at 146 (Wachtler, J., concurring).
92 id.
93 ida
94 Id at 146-47.
2011] 641
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tigation differs greatly from one police department to another and
even within departments, so theoretically at least the constitutional
standard would differ from locale to locale." 95 In a powerful conclu-
sion illustrating his disagreement with the use of the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine, he avowed:
I think both for the sake of certainty and the integrity
of our State and Federal Constitutions we should fol-
low an objective test in situations such as these. If the
police did in fact discover the evidence as the result of
an unconstitutional action, the evidence should be
suppressed. The 'inevitable discovery' doctrine is so
ambiguous and so subject to abuse that I think it is
unwise to adopt it. 96
The New York Court of Appeals returned to the inevitable
discovery doctrine eight years later in People v. Knapp.97 The court
stated the doctrine's purpose: "that fruits of an unlawful search need
not be suppressed where there is a very high degree of probability
that the evidence in question would have been obtained independent-
ly of the tainted source."98 In Knapp, the facts were clear that but for
the illegal search, the drugs would not have been recovered by the of-
ficers unless a search warrant had been issued.99 The court refused to
9 Id. at 146 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96 Fitzpatrick, 300 N.E.2d at 147. See also People v. Payton, 380 N.E.2d 224 (N.Y.
1978). There the court made an important statement regarding the textual reading of the in-
evitable discovery doctrine, stating:
In the first place the label "inevitable discovery" is inaccurate and there-
fore misleading. The doctrine does not call for certitude as the literal
meaning of the adjective "inevitable" would suggest. What is required is
that there be a very high degree of probability that the evidence in ques-
tion would have been obtained independently of the tainted source.
Id at 230-31. Furthermore, Judge Wachtler had a chance to return to his position on the
doctrine, stating "[t]he inevitable discovery doctrine is unrealistic in the purest sense. It
permits the court to ignore what really happened and to rely instead on hypothesis." Id. at
232 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
9 422 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. 1981).
98 Id. at 536 (quoting Payton, 380 N.E.2d at 231 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
9 Id. ("The People do not suggest any other means by which they would have gained pos-
session of the contraband in question except for the by now tainted search of the bedroom
and basement."). See also People v. Walker, 605 N.Y.S.2d 726, 728-29 (App. Div. 4th
Dep't 1993) (holding that the People did not provide any other means in which the evidence
would have been discovered absent the illegal conduct of the police).
642 [Vol. 27
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apply the notion that a hypothetical search would have recovered the
contraband:
Were the rule otherwise, every warrantless nonexigent
seizure automatically would be legitimatized by as-
suming the hypothetical alternative that a warrant had
been obtained. Without the deterrment [sic] effect of
the exclusionary rule, in such circumstances the con-
stitutional warrant procedure for shielding Americans
from unreasonable searches and seizures would be a
shambles.100
In post-Nix decisions, New York courts have applied the in-
evitable discovery doctrine in a unique manner. The genesis of New
York's distinction is evidenced in People v. Stith.10 ' In Stith, two de-
fendants were arrested for criminal possession of a weapon following
the unlawful search of one of the defendant's truck during a traffic
stop.102 Shortly after the defendants were placed under arrest, the po-
lice officers discovered that the truck had been stolen."o' Subse-
quently, the defendants were charged and convicted of criminal pos-
session of a weapon and criminal possession of stolen property.'0
The appellate division held that even though the search of the
truck was a violation of the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights, a
routine registration check of the vehicle would have revealed that the
vehicle was stolen, which in turn would have led to the discovery of
the gun during a police inventory search of the vehicle.'05 The New
York Court of Appeals granted review and faced the issue of "wheth-
er the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule was
properly invoked."' 0 6 In its reasoning, the court stated that "[t]he ex-
clusionary rule generally bars from trial physical, tangible materials
obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful inva-
sion."' 0 7 The court stated that the primary purpose of the rule "is to
"o Knapp, 422 N.E.2d at 536.
1o' 506 N.E.2d 911 (N.Y. 1987).
102 Id. at 912.
103 Id. at 912-13.
'Id
105 Id. at 914.
106 Stith, 506 N.E.2d at 912.
107 Id. at 913 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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deter police misconduct."' 0 ' Although this rule calls for the require-
ment of a warrant during a search, the Supreme Court has declared
"that in some circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on the legitimate de-
mands of law enforcement than can be justified by the rule's deter-
rent purposes."1 09
The court in Stith thoroughly reviewed its prior decisions, and
remarked that this question of the inevitable discovery was one of
first impression because "the evidence sought to be suppressed [was]
the very evidence" acquired during the illegal search." 0 In prior cas-
es, the New York Court of Appeals found that the primary purpose of
the inevitable discovery doctrine was "not to excuse the unlawful po-
lice actions by admitting what was obtained as a direct result of the
initial misconduct." 1" Furthermore, and more importantly, the court
in Stith stated that the inevitable discovery doctrine only applied to
"secondary" evidence rather than primary.112 In its reasoning, the
court stated that if primary evidence were admissible at trial, it would
not deter police misconduct, and it would "be an unacceptable dilu-
tion of the exclusionary rule."ll3 As a result of the Stith decision, the
court concluded that the inevitable discovery doctrine did not ap-
ply.114 The defendants' motion to suppress the weapon was subse-
quently granted.' '1
Ten years later, in People v. Turriago,116 the New York Court
of Appeals applied its holding in Stith to secondary evidence. In Tur-
10 Id (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-09 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in
part)).
no Id. at 913-14.
"' Stith, 506 N.E.2d at 914.
112 id.
It is not the tainted evidence that is admitted, but only what comes from
it as a result of further police investigation. The rationale is that when
the secondary evidence would have been found independently in any
event, the prosecution [should not be] put in a worse position simply be-
cause of some earlier police error or misconduct.
Id. (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 443) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113 Id.
114 id
"' Stith, 422 N.E.2d at 915.
116 681 N.E.2d 350 (N.Y. 1997).
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riago, police stopped the defendant for speeding."' At the time of
the stop, the police asked the defendant for consent to search his ve-
hicle."'8 The defendant agreed, and the murdered body of a male was
found inside the rear of the van along with the hammer used during
the murder.1 9 Back at police headquarters the defendant was inter-
rogated, and information of where and when the victim was murdered
was uncovered.' 20 Using this information, the police obtained search
warrants to investigate the two apartment buildings used by the de-
fendant.12' These subsequent searches revealed more evidence of the
murder and a large quantity of cocaine.122
The appellate division held that the consent given by the de-
fendant was unlawful, and rejected the People's argument that even if
the consent was invalid, the body of the victim would have been dis-
covered during an inventory check after the police learned of the de-
fendant's lack of a valid driver's license.123 The New York Court of
Appeals returned to its inevitable discovery definition created in
Fitzpatrick, where it stated that New York courts require a high de-
gree of probability that the evidence obtained by the illegal search
would have been recovered during routine police procedures.124 The
court in Turriago, relying on its earlier decision in Stith, stated that
primary evidence cannot overcome the exclusionary rule and will
never be admissible if it is discovered as a direct result of an illegal
search.125 As a result of the court's reasoning, it held that the police
1"7 Id. at 352.
118 Id
"9 Id. at 352, 355,
120 Id. at 352.
121 Turriago, 681 N.E.2d at 352.
122 id
123 Id. at 353.
124 Id. at 354-55.
125 Id. at 355.
In People v. Stith, we held as a matter of State constitutional law that
primary evidence, i.e., "the very evidence .. . obtained during or as the
immediate consequence" of the illegal conduct, would still be subject to
exclusion even if it would most likely have been discovered in the course
of routine police procedures.
Turriago, 681 N.E.2d at 355 (quoting Stith, 506 N.E.2d at 913-14 (citations omitted)). More
recently, in People v. Thurman, 917 N.Y.S.2d 784, 786-87 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010), the appel-
late division restated the premise that "the inevitable discovery doctrine 'applies only to sec-
ondary evidence and does not justify admission of the very evidence that was obtained as the
immediate consequence of the illegal police conduct . . .'. " (citing to People v. James, 684
20 11] 645
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would have undoubtedly conducted an inventory search once they
realized that the van was being illegally operated.126 Therefore, the
murdered body would have been "inevitably discovered." 27 Accor-
dingly, the obtaining of the secondary evidence, i.e. the hammer used
during the murder, satisfied the requirements of the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine and should not have been suppressed.128
As demonstrated by federal and New York case law, a differ-
ence exists on whether to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine to
primary evidence.' 29 This concept is exhibited by the fact that the
Second Circuit does not agree with New York's narrow application
of the doctrine."3 In United States v. Taddeo,"' the defendant
wanted suppression of the evidence that was crucial to convicting
him of criminal possession of firearms.132 The defendant claimed
that the contraband should be suppressed because it fell into the cate-
gory of primary evidence. " The defendant cited to the New York
Court of Appeal's decision in Stith in hopes of using state law ideol-
ogy that the inevitable discovery doctrine only applies to secondary
evidence.134  The court discarded the defendant's contention and
held: "There is no requirement that this court apply New York law to
this case . . .. Furthermore, the Second Circuit has expressly rejected
the direct-indirect evidence distinction drawn in earlier inevitable
discovery cases."13 5 The court further stated that to hold otherwise
would ignore the Supreme Court's decision in Nix.136
The court in Saldana correctly rejected the inevitable discov-
ery rule under Stith. However, the Supreme Court in Nix, and the
Second Circuit in Pimentel and Taddeo have applied the doctrine to
evidence found regardless of whether it was primary or secondary.
N.Y.S. 112, 112 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)).
126 Id. at 356.
127 id
128 id
129 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
130 United States v. Taddeo, 932 F.2d 956, 956 (2d Cir. 1991). See infra note 131 and ac-
companying text.
724 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
132 Id. at 81-82.
1 Id. at 87.
134 Id. (citing Stith, 506 N.E.2d at 914).
13 Id. See, e.g., United States v. Whitehorn, 829 F.2d 1225, 1232 (2d Cir. 1987); Pimen-
tel, 810 F.2d at 368-69.
136 Taddeo, 724 F. Supp. at 87.
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The facts of Saldana illustrate that the Watertown Police Pol-
icy is to allow police officers to investigate a person's home after a
fire to evaluate property damage or investigate arson.'3 7 Therefore,
the People's argument that Officer March would have inevitably dis-
covered the marijuana would most likely have been upheld under the
Nix and Pimentel decisions. However, New York takes a more liber-
al approach to the law, affording greater protection of constitutional
rights to its citizens.
Although New York offers higher standards to protect its citi-
zens, the facts of Saldana differ uniquely from prior case law. Ac-
cording to Watertown Police Policy, Officer March had a right to be
at the defendant's home to conduct an arson investigation.'38 Se-
condly, the marijuana was first discovered by the fire department dur-
ing a lawful warrantless search that satisfied the emergency exception
to the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the evidence of the growing opera-
tion was discovered before the police were even involved. Certainly,
the police officers in Saldana had enough probable cause to acquire a
warrant, and it further seems that the correct exclusionary rule excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment should have been the independent
source doctrine.' 39 However, by removing the fact that the firefight-
ers first discovered the marijuana operation, the prosecution relied on
a theory that because of the policy allowing officers to search a home
post-fire, the evidence would have been discovered.
Ultimately, it would be dishonorable to the constitutional
rights of citizens and to the Fourth Amendment to allow police to vi-
olate a person's rights solely because a speculative seizure would
have taken place, or because there is an independent source with
knowledge of the location of the evidence. The inevitable discovery
rule is ambiguous due to the lack of clarity given by the Supreme
Court. This ambiguity is seen in courts around the country, i.e. the
courts basing decisions around whether the evidence is primary or
secondary, and also whether a warrant must have been in the process
of being sought for the exception to be valid. Judge Wachtler's cau-
'n Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at *5.
1 Id. (stating that "it is the policy of the Watertown Police Department following any
structure fire to enter the premises, investigate the potential cause of the fire, and document
the extent and location of the damage while this information is still available in case there is
a subsequent arson investigation"). However, this recent case is strictly set to analyze the
arguments made in the court, and not the inherent question of this policy's constitutionality.
1 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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tious concurrence foresaw the problems faced by the exception and
desired the courts to "follow an objective test . . . . If the police did
in fact discover the evidence as the result of an unconstitutional ac-
tion, the evidence should be suppressed. The 'inevitable discovery'
doctrine is so ambiguous and so subject to abuse that I think it is un-
wise to adopt it."' 40
The court in Nix, however, did clearly state that the primary
purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter police misconduct.
Here, Officer March believed he had a right to enter the defendant's
home according to his employer's post-fire investigation policy.141
Secondly, he spoke with the defendant regarding the contraband
found in the attic and attained a supporting deposition, which granted
police the ability to search and seize the evidence.142 Although the
court in Saldana did not discuss the validity of this deposition, one
can infer that Officer March took reasonable steps that a lawful po-
lice officer would take. However, following New York precedent,
primarily Stith, the court in Saldana held that the marijuana contra-
band was primary evidence. Therefore, regardless of the actual intent
of the officer to follow police procedures, the court correctly held that
the inevitable discovery doctrine was not applicable.
Further juxtaposing the reasoning in Nix and Saldana, the
evidence in both cases was initially discovered by someone other
than the police. To further distinguish Stith, Knapp, and Turriago
from Saldana we must look at how the evidence was discovered. In
all three New York Court of Appeals' decisions, the evidence was
discovered directly by the police. However, in Saldana, the evidence
was first discovered by the fire department, an independent source
that discovered the evidence while performing its official duties. Had
Officer March seized Saldana's bong upon the second search of the
defendant's residence, that evidence would have been classified as
secondary evidence and consequently admissible at trial. Further-
more, had this fact pattern occurred in a jurisdiction that refuses to
differentiate between primary and secondary evidence, Officer
March's conduct would have been acceptable. The distinction be-
tween primary and secondary evidence is questionable in circums-
tances like this, and needs to be cleared up by the high court.
'4 Fitzpatrick, 300 N.E.2d at 147 (Wachtler, J., concurring).
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Therefore, Saldana 's holding reaffirms the guidelines in Stith
pursuant to the classifications of evidence used in the New York state
court system. This ruling will inevitably be used to support the prop-
osition that law enforcement should always acquire a warrant prior to
conducting a search and/or seizure. Police officers should not rely on
the notion that a speculative search would have taken place and that
because of this, they will be allowed to enter a private individual's
residence. In regard to the inevitable discovery exception, the court
in Haddix said it best; "the warrant requirement is at the very heart of
the Fourth Amendment, and [] judicial exceptions to it are only ex-
ceptions."l 4 3
Ara K. Ayvazian
143 Haddix, 239 F.3d at 768.
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